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The Strategy Toolkit

Pattern · Strategy & competition

Unbundling

Also known as Unbundling the corporation, The three core businesses, Customer relationship, product innovation, infrastructure. Anchored to John Hagel III and Marc Singer, 1999; the primary source is cited in full below.

Most companies are three businesses wearing one badge: finding and keeping customers, inventing products, and running infrastructure at scale. Each wants a different cost base and a different pace, so holding all three under one roof means at least two are being run badly.

Corporate · Business unit·Structure the problem · Evaluate options · Allocate resources

Plate · The shape

The customerrelationship businessThe product innovationbusinessThe infrastructurebusiness
The 3 steps of Unbundling, worked in sequence.
I

How it works

Hagel and Singer's argument starts from Coase. A firm exists because it is cheaper to coordinate certain activities internally than to buy them in the market, so the boundary of the firm sits wherever internal coordination stops being cheaper than a transaction. Drop the cost of transacting and the boundary moves.

What they added was the observation that three quite different businesses had been sheltering inside that boundary, held together by coordination costs rather than by any logic of their own. A customer relationship business lives on scope: the more you know about a customer and the more you can sell them, the better it works, and it is judged on share of wallet. A product innovation business lives on speed: small teams, fast cycles, tolerance for failure, and it is judged on time to market. An infrastructure business lives on scale: high volume, repeatable process, relentless unit-cost reduction, and it is judged on utilisation. Put them under one roof and the three compete for the same money and the same attention, and the compromise satisfies none of them.

The move is not automatically to separate. It is to notice which of the three you are actually good at, run that one properly, and be deliberate about how you get the other two rather than letting them run on unexamined.

II

The parts of the model

1

The customer relationship business

Finding customers, building trust and widening what they buy. Economics of scope: the cost of acquiring a customer is high and fixed, so the model pays off through breadth of what that relationship can carry. Culture is service-led and slow to change.

Signals
Acquisition cost is the largest single number in the model and nobody in the room knows it precisely · The business sells products it did not make and is comfortable doing so · Retention matters more to profit than any product decision

2

The product innovation business

Inventing, developing and launching. Economics of speed: value comes from being early, so small teams, short cycles and a tolerated failure rate are the operating conditions. Culture is talent-led and impatient.

Signals
The best people leave when the cycle slows · Success is measured in launches rather than in margin · Process improvements that help everywhere else visibly slow this part down

3

The infrastructure business

Building and running repeatable capacity: logistics, manufacturing, processing, systems, facilities. Economics of scale: high fixed cost, low marginal cost, so the whole game is volume and utilisation. Culture is cost-led and standardising.

Signals
Utilisation is the number the operations director actually manages to · Spare capacity is the largest hidden cost and rarely appears as a line · The unit is capable of serving competitors and has never been allowed to

III

How you know you are in it

You do not fill a pattern in. You recognise yourself in it, or you do not. Read these as a list about your own business rather than as a definition.

  • Your three most senior people want three incompatible things from the same budget, and each of them is right on their own terms.
  • One part of the business is measured on speed, another on cost per unit, and the annual plan quietly averages them into a target that suits neither.
  • A capable operations unit sits at sixty per cent utilisation and everyone accepts this as normal, because the alternative would be serving somebody else's customers.
  • Your best product people keep leaving for smaller firms, and the exit conversations all mention how long things take.
  • The customer-facing side would rather sell a competitor's product on some deals and has learned not to say so out loud.
  • You cannot answer 'which of these three do we actually win on' without a long pause.
IV

The numbers that decide it

  • Cost to acquire a customer against lifetime gross profit from that customer, calculated for the relationship business alone rather than blended across the whole company. Blending is what hides the problem.
  • Fixed-cost utilisation in the infrastructure business, honestly measured, including capacity held back for internal work that a paying third party could have used.
  • Cycle time from concept to revenue in the product business, and the failure rate it is permitted. A tolerated failure rate near zero means the innovation business has already been absorbed by one of the other two.
  • Internal transfer pricing between the three. Where none exists, at least one of them is subsidising another and nobody can say by how much, which is usually the fastest diagnostic in the whole pattern.
  • The cost of the transaction if you did separate: contracting, coordination, quality assurance and the management time to run an arm's-length relationship. Hagel and Singer's argument depends on this number being small, and for a small business it very often is not.
V

When this shape works

  • One of the three is genuinely world-class and is being held back by having to compromise with the other two.
  • An infrastructure unit has real spare capacity and there is a market for it, including among competitors.
  • The transaction costs of buying in what you unbundle have actually fallen, through better standards, better contracts or a mature supplier market, rather than being assumed to have fallen.
  • The business is large enough that the three are already run by different people with different targets, which means the conflict is live rather than theoretical.

And when it doesn't

  • The integration is the product. Where the customer buys the seamlessness, splitting it apart destroys the thing they were paying for.
  • Coordination costs are high because the work is genuinely bespoke, novel or safety-critical, and no contract can specify it well enough to hand over.
  • The business is small enough that the same six people do all three jobs, in which case this is a lens for thinking, not a restructuring plan.
  • The infrastructure carries a regulatory or reputational liability that cannot be contracted away, which is common in financial services, healthcare and anything touching personal data.
VI

How this pattern dies

Averaging

The most common outcome, and it looks like fairness. One set of targets, one budgeting cycle, one approval threshold, applied to three businesses with incompatible clock speeds. The infrastructure business is denied the scale it needs, the innovation business is denied the failure rate it needs, and the relationship business is asked to sell whatever the other two produced.

Unbundling as an outsourcing exercise

The infrastructure business is sold or contracted out for a one-off gain, and three years later the buyer holds the cost base, the data and the ability to serve your competitors, while your margin has not improved because the savings went into the contract rather than into the model.

Keeping the wrong one

The business keeps the part that feels most like its identity rather than the part it actually wins on. Manufacturers keep the factory. Consultancies keep delivery. The customer relationship, which is usually the scarcest and most defensible of the three, gets handed to a distributor, a platform or an agency without anyone treating it as a strategic decision.

Re-bundling by accident

The three are separated on paper, then quietly recombined through shared services, a common IT platform and a single management team, until the org chart says unbundled and the operating reality says otherwise.

VII

In the wild

UK retail banking

The clearest live example of the three splitting in one market. Payments infrastructure has moved to specialists, product manufacture increasingly sits with partners, and the banks have been fighting to keep the customer relationship, which open banking regulation was explicitly designed to loosen. Watch which of the three each institution has decided it is.

The independent brewery

Owner-managed, UK. Brewing is infrastructure, judged on utilisation. The taproom and the subscription club are the relationship business, judged on retention. New recipes are product innovation, judged on how quickly they get to a pump. One founder usually runs all three and wonders why the week never balances.

Amazon Web Services

Infrastructure unbundled from the retailer that built it, then sold to everyone including the retailer's competitors. The canonical demonstration that spare capacity treated as a business is worth more than spare capacity treated as an overhead.

The recruitment firm that kept the relationship

Owner-managed, UK. Candidate sourcing, screening and payroll are all bought in from specialists; the firm keeps only the client relationships and the judgement about fit. Fewer staff, lower fixed cost, higher margin per consultant, and a business that is genuinely transferable because the relationships sit with named account owners.

VIII

The owner-managed version

In a business of thirty people you will not be restructuring into three legal entities, and you should not try. But the lens still earns its keep, because the conflict is real at every size and it usually shows up as a diary problem rather than a strategy problem.

Take your own week and put every hour into one of the three buckets. Selling and looking after customers goes in the first. Developing the offer goes in the second. Running the machine that delivers it goes in the third. Most owners discover they are spending seventy per cent of their time on infrastructure, which is the one of the three that a competent hire can take over fastest and the one that will never make the business more valuable.

Then ask the harder question. Of the three, which one do you actually win on? Not which one you enjoy, and not which one you started out doing. If the honest answer is the customer relationship, then delivery is a cost to be industrialised or bought in, and every hour you spend perfecting it is an hour taken from the thing that pays. If the honest answer is the infrastructure, then you may have a business that should be selling capacity to people you currently think of as competitors, which is an uncomfortable conversation worth having.

The practical version of unbundling in an owner-managed firm is rarely a break-up. It is separate targets, separate reporting, and a stated decision about which of the three the business is going to be excellent at, so that the other two stop quietly bidding for the same attention.

IX

Changing out of this shape

Start by measuring the three separately for one quarter, even if the split is rough, because averaged numbers are what keep the pattern invisible. Then set a genuine transfer price between them. If the infrastructure unit had to charge the relationship unit a market rate, and the relationship unit could refuse and buy elsewhere, you would learn within one quarter which of the three is carrying the others. Only after that is the question of contracting, selling or spinning out worth asking, and Hagel and Singer's own test still applies: unbundle when the cost of transacting across the boundary is lower than the cost of the compromise you are currently making inside it.

X

Where to go from here

Frameworks that work inside this pattern

  • Value Chain Analysis

    A disaggregation of the firm into nine strategically relevant activities, five primary and four support, to locate where cost is incurred and differentiation is created, on the premise that advantage lives in activities, not in the firm as a whole.

  • Core Competence Analysis

    A test of what a corporation is genuinely good at: the collective learning and coordination skills that pass three tests by opening access to a wide variety of markets, contributing significantly to perceived customer benefit, and resisting imitation.

  • Business Model Canvas

    A one-page visual template that describes how an organisation creates, delivers and captures value across nine building blocks, from customer segments through to cost structure, so an entire business model can be seen, questioned and redesigned in a single view.

  • Porter's Generic Strategies

    Porter's argument that sustainable advantage comes from one deliberate choice: compete on lower cost or on differentiation, across a broad market or a narrow one. Firms that refuse to choose end up stuck in the middle, and the middle is where margins go to die.

  • Theory of Constraints

    Goldratt's argument that every system has one binding constraint that sets its throughput. Find it, wring the most from it, subordinate everything else to it, invest to elevate it, then start again, because once a constraint is broken the constraint moves somewhere else.

Playbooks that work the problem

  • Turning a Business Round

    Diagnosis before initiatives. Find out whether each sale makes money, where the losses pile up and what is throttling output, then point the whole organisation at the few fixes that matter. A week of honest arithmetic saves a year of energetic guesswork.

  • Running Annual Planning

    Annual planning as a chain of decisions instead of a writing exercise: surface the assumptions, make the real choices including what to stop, draw the logic on one page, then commit to numbers that report back every quarter.

Neighbouring patterns

  • The Productised Service

    Bespoke work turned into something with a name, a fixed scope, a fixed price and a delivery system that does not depend on which clever person is free that week, so the business can be sold, staffed and improved rather than merely performed.

  • The Multi-Sided Platform

    A business that makes money by bringing two groups together who each need the other, where the decisive question is not what to charge but which side to charge, because the side you subsidise is the side that makes the whole thing work.

Describe your situation to the Analysis Engine

XI

What the critics say

Unbundling is not a one-way ratchet, and treating it as an inevitability is the standard error. Christensen and Raynor argue that integration and modularity oscillate: profit migrates to whichever layer is not yet good enough, so the same industry that unbundles under one set of performance conditions re-integrates under the next. Apple re-bundled hardware, software and distribution in exactly the years the theory said it should have been coming apart.

Christensen, C. M. and Raynor, M. E. (2003) The Innovator's Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

The three-business taxonomy has almost no empirical grounding. Business-model typologies of this era were built from case observation and argued by illustration, and reviews of the literature have criticised the field for exactly that: plausible categories, few tests, and no agreement on what would count as disconfirming evidence. Use the three as a lens, not as a classification you expect a real company to fall neatly into.

Zott, C., Amit, R. and Massa, L. (2011) 'The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future Research', Journal of Management, 37(4), pp. 1019-1042.

The argument rests on transaction costs falling, which Coase's framework makes precise for economic costs and vague for everything else. Coordination, trust and the cost of a supplier learning your business are all real and rise sharply the moment an activity crosses a company boundary. Many unbundlings that looked correct on a spreadsheet failed on the parts of the transaction cost nobody priced.

Coase, R. H. (1937) 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4(16), pp. 386-405.
XII

Sources and further reading

  • Hagel, J. III and Singer, M. (1999) 'Unbundling the Corporation', Harvard Business Review, 77(2), pp. 133-141.
  • Coase, R. H. (1937) 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4(16), pp. 386-405.
  • Christensen, C. M. and Raynor, M. E. (2003) The Innovator's Solution. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
  • Osterwalder, A. and Pigneur, Y. (2010) Business Model Generation. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 56-63, which presents unbundling as a business model pattern and credits Hagel and Singer.